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and Queer Ambivalence in an Age of Assimilation 
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The concept of ambivalence in U.S. queer studies has tended to be less a subject of enquiry in itself 
and more a component of, or catalyst for, broader arguments about how heteronormative culture 
shapes, restricts, and challenges queer subjectivities. In this article I explore three forms of 
ambivalence in order to argue that the foregrounding of publicly ambivalent positions is essential 
for renegotiating what it means to be queer in an age of respectability politics and conditional 
mainstream acceptance. 
 
 
On 26 June 2015, in the case of Obergefell et al. v. Hodges, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled by a 
five-to-four vote that the Constitution guarantees a right to same-sex marriage. In the words of Justice 
Anthony M. Kennedy, concluding the majority opinion, marriage is a “keystone of our social order” 
(Kennedy 4). This represents an important but ambivalent victory for queer communities in the U.S. 
While federal recognition grants to same-sex married partners the benefits, rights, and privileges 
associated with heterosexual marriage and private citizenship, it remains the case that, as many queer 
activists and theorists have pointed out, marriage can be used as a tool of anti-black racism, of 
immigration enforcement, of gendered social control, and is at core about protecting private property 
(see, for instance, Duggan, Conrad, and Spade and Wilse). In light of the U.S. legalisation of same-sex 
marriage and the ambivalent victory it entails, the concept of ambivalence itself requires fresh 
scrutiny. Ambivalence – the simultaneous experience of contradictory affects, feelings, and emotions 
toward an object – is a formative, unavoidable, and even definitive aspect of queer experience. It has, 
however, tended to be less a subject of inquiry in itself and more a component of, or catalyst for, 
broader arguments about how heteronormative culture shapes, restricts, and challenges queer 
subjectivities. In what follows I will explore three different but inextricably connected forms of 
ambivalence, manifesting in literary texts, in order to argue that the foregrounding and occupation of 
publicly ambivalent positions is essential for renegotiating what it means to be queer in an age of 
respectability politics and conditional mainstream acceptance. 
Heteronormativity describes the structural conditions that establish and maintain the notion 
that reproductive heterosexuality is normal. The term was coined in 1991 by Michael Warner in his 
introduction to the now canonical anthology Fear of a Queer Planet, and has roots in particular in the 
work of Adrienne Rich and Gayle Rubin. In a collaborative essay entitled “Sex in Public,” Warner and 
Lauren Berlant argue that heteronormativity not only organises heterosexuality as natural, but 
attributes to it a sense of “society-founding rightness” (312). Far from simply indicating the gender of 
those towards whom one is romantically and sexually inclined in one’s “private life,” heterosexuality 
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becomes “the basic idiom of the personal and the social” (312). In order for this to happen, 
heteronormative culture “organize[s] a hegemonic national public around sex,” which it officially 
purports to do “in order to protect the zone of heterosexual privacy,” but which it in fact does in order 
to protect the “institutions of economic privilege and social reproduction” that prop up and are 
propped up by heteronormativity (314). To this end, the marriage - and couple - forms are consecrated 
by heteronormative culture as the legitimate forms of intimate social relation through which national 
existence is mediated. The ideal citizen according to this model is heterosexual and part of a family 
unit – a worker and consumer who complies more or less willingly with the demands of capitalist 
society. 
The key point Berlant and Warner make is that intimacy and sexuality in heteronormative 
culture are relegated to the sanctioned zones of the couple - and family - forms, which are constructed 
as private rather than public realms. This private realm is the realm of personhood, of “personal life,” 
a space apparently distinct from the public realm of work and politics into and out of which people 
move on a daily basis in a more or less linear fashion. However, because heteronormative culture 
takes as given the reproduction of heterosexuality, casting heterosexuality as the default position 
integral to its continued operation, even those aspects of society which superficially appear to have 
nothing to do with sex can in fact be read in the register of sexuality, because they are predicated on 
the assumption of heterosexuality. In this context, then, heterosexuality describes not just the private 
relations between opposite-sex individuals; it is also a naturalised, naturalising, and fundamentally 
public form of cultural and social organisation, expressed by and equally expressive of that culture 
which sanctions it and which, in turn, is sanctioned by it. Furthermore, this illusorily private realm of 
intimate personhood, in being conceived as separate from public life, also becomes the primary site of 
consolation against the tribulations, oppressions, and inequalities of public life necessary for the social 
reproduction of economic privilege. Mitigating the affective and material fallout of living according to 
the dictates of capital then becomes a private rather than a public concern. Heteronormativity as a 
structural force thus encourages individuals to conceive of their private lives as “prepolitical,” rather 
than as the product of sociopolitical circumscription (Berlant and Warner 317). Even though the 
intimate world it creates often fails to provide the “good life” happiness it promises, this failure is 
typically seen as the fault of individuals rather than the institution(s) of heteronormativity. 
A further key point is that heteronormativity and heterosexuality should not be understood as 
synonymous. While heteronormativity creates and maintains the social conditions necessary for the 
reproduction of normative heterosexual expression, heterosexual activity that repudiates these norms 
cannot be called heteronormative.1 At the same time, as the legalisation of same-sex marriage 
indicates, homosexual activity is not necessarily opposed to heteronormativity. The term 
homonormativity has been used to describe gay and lesbian politics that prioritise assimilating into 
heteronormative culture over contesting naturalised ideals of matrimony, procreation, and systems of 
binary gender. In the words of Jasbir Puar, homonormativity “aids the process of heteronormativity 
																																								 																				
1 It is important to acknowledge, however, that heterosexual deviation from heteronormativity is far more 
tolerable to heteronormative culture, and far less dangerous to the individual, than queer deviation, due to the 
privileged position occupied by heterosexuals in heteronormative society. 
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through the fracturing away of queer alliances in favour of adherence to the reproduction of class, 
gender, and racial norms” (Puar 31-32). As Berlant and Warner point out, “queer culture constitutes 
itself in many ways other than through . . . the privatised forms normally associated with sexuality . . . 
while elaborating a public world of belonging and transformation . . . that bear[s] no necessary 
relation to domestic space, to kinship, to the couple form, to property, or to the nation” (322). One 
example of this is the communities of care that arose in major cities early in the AIDS crisis, in which 
gays and lesbians, neglected and demonised by the government, took on the responsibility of caring 
for the swiftly increasing number of sick and dying (predominantly) gay men surrounding them.2 
Another can be witnessed in the early fiction of Sarah Schulman, which depicts a rapid, improvisatory, 
and continually shifting world of publicly intimate relations, in which the main aim is “to keep feelings 
in circulation” in ways that challenge the illusion propagated by heteronormative culture that intimacy 
is private and prepolitical (Schulman 67). 
The term queer has generally been mobilised against heterosexual and homosexual 
normativity to describe an orientation that is not only “anti-heteronormative, but . . . anti-normative” 
(Halberstam 77). In the words of David Halperin, queer refers not to any specific sexual or gender 
identity but to “whatever is at odds with the normal, the legitimate, the dominant” (Halperin 62). 
Queer, then, is particularly useful in describing not just sexual and gender identity but one’s 
politicised commitment to difference, inclusion, non-normative modes of being, and even the 
abolition of fixed identity categories altogether. In recent years, however, much work in queer studies 
has sought to interrogate “the enduring charisma of the normative” in a less oppositional manner 
(Berlant 44). My intention in this article is not to pit homonormative assimilation against radical 
queerness in a reductive binary; nor to vaunt queer publicity as the only morally and politically 
legitimate response to the legalisation of same-sex marriage; nor necessarily to pit queerness against 
projects of normalisation. Instead, my aim is to elucidate and distinguish some of the main 
ambivalences that inhere to heteronormative, homonormative, and queer experience. I argue that 
heteronormative ambivalence describes the public suppression of contradiction and the privatisation 
of its negative effects in order to reinforce and reproduce the status quo. Homonormative 
ambivalence, arising from shame induced by heteronormativity, seeks resolution through inclusion 
within the structures that produced the ambivalence in the first place. Queer ambivalence foregrounds 
the experience of ambivalence itself, in order to expose and interrogate the conditions in which it is 
produced. It seeks, in the suspension of resolution, new, more successful and sustainable ways of 
resisting the toxic elements of privatised intimacy and sexuality, and reframes the experience of 
ambivalence as valuable in itself. Finally, queer ambivalence is perhaps especially useful for 
dismantling the ease with which dichotomies like normative and queer themselves become 
normalised, in search of more open and inclusive ways of thinking and being. 
 
Scenes of Ambivalence 
Heteronormative culture sees ambivalence as a problem requiring resolution, and as an 
individual (private) fault rather than as a product of structural (public) conditions. It also tends to 
																																								 																				
2 For a thorough history of this phase of AIDS activism, see Gould 2009, esp. pp. 55-120 
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feminise ambivalence-management, reinforcing naturalised differences between masculinity and 
femininity and upholding binary notions of gender. In situating ambivalence within the private, 
domestic sphere, heteronormative culture acts to minimise the radical or disruptive potential of 
ambivalence by psychopathologising its effects. For example, Sigmund Freud argued that ambivalence 
arises during Oedipal conflict. As the (male) child begins to compete with his father for his mother, he 
is forced into a contradictory position: hating his father as competitor but retaining for him his “old-
established affection and admiration” (2769). In order to find relief from this conflict between love 
and hate, the child displaces his hostile feelings onto a substitute object. This displacement can result 
in neurosis-formation, as in the famous case of equinophobic Little Hans. The child who successfully 
resolves Oedipal conflict is more able in later life to deal with the ambivalence that inheres in all 
intimate relations; the child who fails to do so is liable to become or remain neurotic, and thus unable 
to healthily confront their ambivalence and correspond with social norms. The point is that, if 
ambivalence is intimately bound to the “heteronormative reinforcement” the Oedipus complex enacts 
by inducting individuals into accordance with dominant heteronormative culture, then the successful 
(i.e. normal) resolution or suppression of ambivalence can be said to be an important aspect of the 
reproduction of heteronormativity (Boyarin 206). Failure to resolve one’s ambivalence can then be 
described as psychopathological; furthermore, the successful resolution of ambivalence becomes tied 
up with toxic heteronormative prescriptions of masculinity. 
Nancy Armstrong complicates this understanding of ambivalence by arguing that the liberal 
notion of the subject as a rational actor more or less in charge of his feelings and emotions is 
historically contingent on the relegation of ambivalence-management to the realm of so-called 
femininity. As Lauren Berlant elaborates, this feminisation of ambivalence explicitly reinforces the 
patriarchy at the heart of heteronormativity by creating “the figura of autonomy” in those sufficiently 
privileged to perceive themselves as relatively coherent and consistent private individuals in charge of 
their affects and capable of acting rationally. Contending with the often debilitating affective intensity 
of ambivalence becomes a feminine task, leaving masculinised bodies free to act decisively and 
directly in both public and private realms. The ideal subject position thus becomes one in which 
ambivalence is suppressed; to succumb to irresolution is feminine or even antisocial. In practice, of 
course, this is difficult to sustain. 
Richard Yates’s fiction provides an especially lucid example of the corrosive effects of 
heteronormative ambivalence. His first and most famous novel, Revolutionary Road, depicts the 
dissolution of Frank and April Wheeler’s marriage. Focussing on the discrepancies between Frank’s 
internal life and external actions, the novel charts his construction of compensatory fantasies to gloss 
over the disappointing facts of his existence and quell his ambivalence. From a perspective of ironic 
detachment, Yates documents the contrasts between Frank’s private thoughts and his public 
performance of conformity with heteronormative demands. 
Early in the novel, following a vicious argument with April the night before, Frank awakens 
hungover to see April “wearing a man’s shirt” (Yates 34-35) while mowing the lawn. His thoughts 
wander as he watches from their bedroom window, preparing to reaffirm his masculinity by going 
outside and taking the mower from her “by force if necessary” (40). The narrative traces Frank and 
April’s shared history from their early relationship to the present. Their marriage, it transpires, was 
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prompted by April’s unexpected pregnancy. April responded to the news by withdrawing from Frank, 
evoking his anxiety that he is not in control of their relationship and its heteronormative evolution: 
“Your wife wasn’t supposed to turn away from you, was she? You weren’t supposed to have to work 
and wheedle to win her back . . . as if you were afraid she might evaporate at the very moment of this 
first authentic involvement of your lives” (49). April unambivalently wanted an abortion; Frank, while 
privately agreeing, struggled to accept that she decided this on her own. April eventually breaks down 
following a long argument and agrees to have the baby: “no single moment of his life had ever 
contained a better proof of manhood than . . . holding that tamed, submissive girl and saying ‘Oh, my 
lovely; oh, my lovely,’ while she promised she would bear his child . . . .  ‘And I didn’t even want a 
baby’” (51-52). 
This scene demonstrates the complex relationship between heteronormativity’s broad 
suppression of ambivalence, and its subsequent impact on specific individuals. April behaves contrary 
to the role she is expected to take in the traditional couple-form by confidently deciding she does not 
want her baby. In doing so she shows how, despite heteronormative culture’s gendering of 
ambivalence, specific individuals often think against its demands (although their capacity for 
resistance is mediated by their structural positions). Frank, meanwhile, occupies a more traditionally 
“feminine” position, full of emotive outbursts and affective intensity. He is ambivalent about the 
pregnancy. He wants “shared” excitement with April about this “first authentic involvement” of their 
lives, at the same time as not wanting to have a child yet, and agreeing with her decision (49). 
Heteronormative culture saturates Frank’s ambivalence: he wants to live up to its sanctioning of 
procreation and matrimony as natural, desirable, and essential aspects of any authentic romantic 
relationship, because to capitulate to his simultaneous disinclination would render his experience of 
the world and of himself as a normal heterosexual man illegible, and thus expose the private 
contradictions his public identity seeks to mask. The need to suppress this troubling ambivalence is 
exacerbated by April’s masculinised unambivalence. Frank therefore utilises the power and privilege 
of his structural position, forcefully denying April’s agency and reducing her to submission. He thus 
“pro[ves] his manhood,” suppressing his own ambivalence while consigning April to the feminine 
position of ambivalence-management on which his sense of masculine agency is contingent. Frank 
resolves his ambivalence by according with heteronormative patriarchy. Instead of finding in their 
ambivalences the public, structural conditions that have produced them, both characters eventually 
conform to type against their own desires. They privatise their ambivalence and attack one another, 
destroying in the process their desire for a less sanctioned existence and reinforcing the norms that 
have stifled them in the first place. 
Homonormative and queer experience are generally framed as being opposed, as indicated 
above in Jasbir Puar’s categorisation of the former as sapping away the radical vitality of the latter. 
For this reason I will look at homonormative and queer ambivalence in conjunction. While the 
concept of ambivalence has attracted surprisingly little critical attention in itself, gay and lesbian 
experiences of ambivalence have been documented relatively extensively.3 Deborah Gould describes 
																																								 																				
3 On ambivalence in general see Freud 1900, 1909, 1916-17; Merton and Barber 1963; Laplanche and Pontalis 
1973; Smelser 1998; Warner 1999.  
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gay and lesbian ambivalence as “a contradictory constellation of simultaneously felt positive and 
negative affective states about both homosexuality and dominant, heteronormative society” (Gould 
12). For Gould, ambivalence is the defining affective backdrop against which queers in general 
experience public and private life, due to the fact that their sexualities, gender expressions, and even 
their simple right to exist, have been consistently and often violently impugned at both micro and 
macro levels. My suggestion is that homonormative assimilationism and queer radicalism both stem 
from the attempt to resolve the ambivalence that arises from the shame of being non-normative in a 
profoundly heteronormative society. 
Michelle Tea’s Valencia is a fast-paced memoir that narrates the author’s promiscuous 
twentysomething years, set in the early 1990s in a then predominantly lesbian area of San Francisco’s 
now increasingly gentrified Mission district. In the chapter I am looking at, narrator Michelle and her 
girlfriend Iris leave their shame-free, publicly queer life in the Mission to attend Iris’s sister’s wedding 
in conservative Georgia. Though Iris’s family do not entirely reject their daughter for being gay, they 
do expect signs of her queerness to be hidden when in their presence. Iris is required to behave 
homonormatively in order to participate in conventional family life. By suppressing the public identity 
permitted to her by the queer community in San Francisco, she is allowed the comforting normative 
pleasures of the sanctioned family form. Michelle and Iris both, with varying degrees of willingness 
and consistency, internalise these demands: “[we] thought it would be fun to have sex . . . in the house 
where [Iris] grew up . . . and we did attempt some weak teenage boy-girl seduction in front of the 
television, but . . . we couldn’t smack each other or play around with the recycled bicycle tire whip 
because it would wake Mom” (113-114). They subsequently abandon their libidos for the remainder of 
the trip and resume a “slug-like position on the couch” (114). 
The chapter is striking in two regards. The first is in its depiction of the collision between 
homonormative and queer ambivalence. On the eve of Iris’s sister’s wedding, Michelle breaks down 
and considers not attending the ceremony: “Maybe I Just Won’t Go. I Can’t Go. I was crying on Iris’s 
bed. It’s Just Wrong That I Can’t Hold Your Hand. We Always Hold Hands. I was wracked by the 
injustice . . . And Iris, it seemed so easy for her to pretend we were pals” (129). Michelle becomes 
resentful: “Little tough-shit-kiss-my-ass Iris, all self-righteous in San Francisco . . . and she can’t even 
hold my fucking hand. But it’s her family, and that’s a big deal, and you can’t force someone” (130). 
Iris, who has a lot more at stake in this family context than Michelle, is coerced into suppressing the 
ambivalence she feels about denying her queer identity. Toleration by her family is conditional on the 
minimisation of her queerness and her conformity with heteronormative protocol, and she complies 
intuitively as a result of heteronormative culture’s conditioning. Michelle, though hurt and frustrated 
by Iris’s behaviour, understands her actions and accepts them. Whereas Iris’s ambivalence is 
homonormative, in that she seeks its resolution through suppression, Michelle’s ambivalence is queer 
in its accommodation of Iris’s concessions to normativity. Michelle experiences disgust with the need 
to conform, at the same time as accepting that in an overwhelmingly heteronormative culture one 
sometimes needs to defy oneself and conform with demands to which one is fundamentally opposed. 
Significantly, her ambivalence remains active and unresolved. 
The second striking aspect of the chapter resides in the fact that it is not necessarily Michelle 
and Iris’s homosexuality that bothers Iris’s family, so much as their deviation from the norm. This is 
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demonstrated by Iris’s sister, the conventional bride, not wanting to be overshadowed on the day of 
her wedding by Michelle’s green hair and butch appearance. After reluctantly “scrub[bing] the lime 
colour from [her] scruff”, Michelle concludes that the bride “didn’t want everyone to be paying 
attention to me and my green hair on her big day” (129). In other words, as long as the signs of their 
queerness are removed, allowing their sexuality to become a private affair separate from the public 
ceremony of heteronormative matrimony, Michelle and Iris will be permitted to participate free from 
overt harassment. The passively homophobic family’s ambivalence regarding the love they feel for Iris 
on the one hand, and their fear and confusion about her sexuality on the other, is resolved for them 
through the privatisation of Iris’s queerness. This illustrates both the problem with homonormativity, 
as well as what its assimilative tendencies seek to resolve: to be accepted as normal by those who are 
consecrated as such, one must publicly conform to established norms. The assimilationist emphasis 
on homonormative conformity aims to resolve ambivalence by legitimating queer sexuality as no 
different to normative heterosexuality. The hope is that, as public opinion changes, the public kissing 
and handholding Michelle ambivalently foregoes will eventually be accepted by culture as the same as 
its heterosexual equivalent. However, the radical public intimacy and experimental approach to 
community and relationality that is elsewhere depicted in Valencia, and which grants the text – and 
queer forms of intimacy in practice – much of its invigorating and galvanising force, must be foregone 
if its queer characters wish to attain the public acceptance accorded by normative private personhood. 
What, then, does queer ambivalence entail? Texts like Valencia demonstrate that 
homonormativity is, at an individual level, an understandable response to oppression. Queer people 
need to get through the day and, in an overwhelmingly heteronormative culture, the prospect of legal 
and cultural recognition, and the various benefits such recognition entails, represents a powerful pull, 
especially for those who are privileged in other respects (middle-class, white, male, cisgender, able-
bodied) and thus more immediately able to reap those benefits. My suggestion is that recognition of 
the contradictory pleasures of normativity is itself a key component of queer ambivalence. Many 
people for numerous intersecting reasons – occupational, generational, religious, racial, etc. – are not 
able to publicly perform their sexuality or pursue queer forms of intimacy that resist 
heteronormativity. The recognition of queerness and normativity’s ambivalent relationship by queer 
radicals who are fundamentally opposed to heteronormativity and the system it serves to uphold 
rejects neat dichotomies between normative and not.  Such recognition demands that closer attention 
be paid to the particularities of specific lives in specific situations conditioned by specific structural 
conditions, rather than further alienating or even castigating people for their relative, and often 
superficial, conformity. Furthermore, it foregrounds the recognition that many non-normative people 
seek ambivalent sanctuary in normative institutions and relations because it is difficult or deadly not 
to, or simply because the pressure of constant resistance can be too exhausting. The resolution of 
homonormative ambivalence through assimilation can then be understood as beneficial for some at an 
individual level, if still deeply problematic at a structural level.   
Queer ambivalence, then, describes a form of experience that comprehends the 
heteronormative division between private and public life, and acknowledges one’s own ambivalent 
position in and towards it. Unlike heteronormative ambivalence, which suppresses and privatises 
ambivalence in order to reinforce patriarchal heteronormativity, and unlike homonormative 
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ambivalence which seeks relief through conformity with heteronormative culture’s private/public 
divide, queer ambivalence entails publicly foregrounding the experience of ambivalence itself as a 
form of inclusivity. While in practice queer ambivalence can and must appear in a variety of ways, the 
essential component on which I wish to focus is its refusal to distinguish absolutely between 
queerness and normativity: both can be experienced at once, and for most queers in contemporary 
culture they have to be. 
Maggie Nelson’s recent essay-memoir The Argonauts (2015) explores the relationship 
between Nelson, an acclaimed and successful author and academic, and the butch, male-passing 
Harry Dodge, an equivalently successful and acclaimed artist, to whom she is married. Through a 
series of poetic fragments, observations, and passages of varyingly linear narrative, the text traces 
Nelson’s shift away from the radical anti-normativity she lived by before meeting Dodge, towards an 
embrace of marriage and parenthood that she would previously have dismissed as heteronormative. 
Ambivalence is foregrounded consistently throughout as a way of resisting becoming trapped in “the 
tired binary that places femininity, reproduction, and normativity on one side and masculinity, 
sexuality, and queer resistance on the other” (135.4, emphasis in original), and of rejecting having to 
choose finally between queerness or normativity. While gripping in its depiction of the frustrations of 
trying to reconcile the couple’s domesticity with their radical politics, most pertinent to my 
characterisation of queer ambivalence are the sections that treat queerness as a form of perpetual 
movement: a “pure wildness” (94.8), a refusal of the “[unsustainable] binary of 
normative/transgressive,” (94.8) and, drawing on the work of Eve Sedgwick, a way of “asserting while 
giving the slip” (54). 
Much as married life and parenthood is not always conducive to such dynamic motion, Nelson 
wonders whether or not prose might be “but the gravestone” (94.8) of wildness in its capacity for 
specificity; and yet earlier in the book, writing is held up as the only place where she has ever been 
able to consistently find the sense of “merging” entailed by ambivalence’s refusal of neat and distinct 
resolution (85.8). In other words, established norms and forms often have stultifying effects on 
individuals, but they can also contain vital and even radical force by being explored queerly. The text 
of The Argonauts itself performs this contradiction through its foregrounding of an array of 
ambivalences whose content pushes against the specificity of its form; at the same time, she questions 
whether or not such a performance is merely an elaborate intellectual game replete with “boring . . . 
reversals” and lazy deconstructions (79). In doing so, Nelson articulates both the vitality and the 
privilege of ambivalence: while exposing the radical potential of interactions between queerness and 
normativity, she also highlights the cultural and economic privilege required to inhabit the 
contradictions her text depicts. This illustrates the need for intersectional analysis when considering 
the political utility of ambivalence. While queer ambivalence is important in its capacity for 
inclusivity, any advocation of ambivalence must register the necessity of unambivalence for those 
who, quite simply, do not have sufficient respite to withstand the contradictoriness of productively 
ambivalent experience. In other words, queer ambivalence must always maintain ambivalence 
towards itself. 
The Argonauts shows how one couple collapse “the tired binary” into something more 
sustainably liveable without ever capitulating uncritically to normativity. It showcases the pleasures 
FORUM | ISSUE 21 Joshua Jones 10 
 
	
and struggles of remaining suspended in ambivalence and elaborating new ways of living with old and 
dominant forms, and situates queerness and normativity in the present day of gay rights as existing by 
necessity in a new and dynamic symbiosis. Most significantly, The Argonauts’ interminable 
exploration of Nelson’s own intimate queerness through the public optic of ambivalence refuses to 
seal that queerness into the safety of private personhood. 
The present is a very different context than the one out of which radically anti-normative 
queer theory emerged in the early 1990s, with Bowers vs. Hardwick still upholding the 
criminalisation of sodomy, and protease inhibitors yet to be developed, to name just two factors; at 
the same time, the relative safety queer people experience today is by no means equally distributed.4 
Queer ambivalence, then, can be understood to describe: a) a contemporary attitude or approach to 
experience that rejects the heteronormative privatisation of personhood at the same time as 
acknowledging and seeking to understand the desire by many queers to embrace elements of it; b) 
resistance to binaries that establish queerness and normativity as irreconcilably opposed by being 
critically and cautiously open to the intersection of both; and c) making ambivalence public and 
therefore inclusive by understanding oneself and one’s queerness as not a component of private 
personhood but a fundamentally public identity that can and must be situated historically. 
Considering ambivalence queerly elucidates the queerness of the concept itself, a queerness 
that is avoided by hetero and homonormative forms in their suppression of ambivalence. To 
acknowledge and adapt to the fact that elements of heteronormative culture are now more open than 
ever to some queer people does not entail unambivalent embracing or rejection of that fact. Instead, 
by foregrounding ambivalence queerly and categorising it as a fundamental and even pleasurable 
condition of experience, queer people can more realistically resist the ambivalent lure of privacy and, 
to echo to an earlier quotation from Girls, Visions, and Everything, keep their feelings about the 
current state of things unsuppressed and in circulation. A queered understanding of ambivalence is 
vital to negotiating the changing terrain of queerness now and foregrounding questions of private and 
public sexuality at a time when, as The Argonauts exemplifies, the family form itself is being queered 
by radicals who have ambivalently embraced parenthood.5 The concept of queer ambivalence is one 
way of evoking and reframing for the contemporary moment the sense of openness, inclusivity, of 
feelings kept in circulation, while gesturing towards new ways of being queer in an age of assimilation. 
 
	  
																																								 																				
4 It is important not to overstate this comparative safety, in order not to overshadow the many dangers and 
oppressions still experienced by queer trans people, people of colour, and disabled people. For an overview of 
queer theory’s exclusivity, see Cohen 1997. 
5 See also Califia 2004 
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